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The Federal Courts of Canada have matured alongside modern environmental law. Created in 
1971, the Federal Courts’ origin falls squarely between the 1969 enactment of the influential 
National Environmental Protection Act (US) and the United Nations’ 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment. These mark the birth of the modern era of 
environmental law, a time when degradation of land, air and water became unignorable. 
Canada began to do its part. The 1970s saw the creation of a separate Department of the 
Environment (now known as Environment and Climate Change Canada), the enactment of the 
Canada Water Act and Clean Air Act, significant environment-protection changes to the 
Fisheries Act, the internationally-renowned Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and the 
development of environmental assessment review.1 This was the era in which a corpus federal 
environmental law was formed. 
 
Reforms to Canadian environmental law that attempt to address pressing environmental issues 
have ebbed and flowed.2 In many ways, the Federal Courts’ jurisprudence reflects this pattern. 
Faced with reviewing decisions taken under equivocal and discretionary environmental 
legislation, the Federal Courts have only partially incorporated and elaborated the well-known 
principles of environmental law that populate the realm of international environmental law and 
which have seen robust development in other jurisdictions.3 At the same time, there are 
pockets of the Federal Courts’ jurisprudence that serve as important toeholds for future 
development as the Courts continue to grapple with the legal dimensions of urgent and 
ongoing environmental challenges. 
 
 
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia. Many thanks to Imalka 
Nilmalgoda (Allard JD ’21) for excellent research assistance. Thanks to the editors for inviting me to contribute to 
this anniversary edition and to Craig Forcese for his helpful feedback on this chapter. Thanks to David Boyd, Laura 
Bowman, Martin Olszynski and Stepan Wood for early suggestions on significant decisions to include. I am very 
grateful to Lara Tessaro for her detailed feedback on an early draft as well as the comments from two anonymous 
reviewers. Finally, I am grateful for the support provided by the Law Foundation of British Columbia. All errors 
remain my own. 
1 These developments are summarized in Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner and Benjamin J. Richardson, “What Ever 
Happened to Canadian Environmental Law?” (2010) 37 Ecology L. Q. 981 at 996-997. 
2 Ibid; David R. Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2003); David R. Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier: A Prescription for Stronger Canadian Environmental Laws and 
Policies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015). 
3 Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel and Adriana Fabra, Principles of International Environmental Law, 3d ed 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) [Sands]; Natasha Affolder, “Domesticating the Exotic Species: 
International Biodiversity Law in Canada” (2006) 51 McGill L. J. 217 [Affolder]. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union and the New South Wales Land and Environment Court are prominent counter-examples.  
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The focus of this chapter is on these cross-cutting legal principles, such as the precautionary 
principle, sustainable development, and participatory rights to access environmental justice. In 
addition to their existing or emerging status as customary international law, these principles are 
codified in most federal environmental statutes. While environmental principles cannot 
perform the Herculean task of unifying the complex and diverse strands of environmental law, 
they do allow for a thematic synthesis of much of the Federal Courts’ environmental caselaw. 
As Eloise Scotford, a scholar of principles in environmental law, writes, “…environmental 
principles are significant focal points for determining the nuanced evolution of environmental 
law within discrete legal systems, in terms of their own legal frameworks, doctrines and 
cultures…”4 This chapter examines these focal points, and in so doing, it illustrates broader 
aspects of the Federal Courts’ doctrine and culture and it portends some future pathways as 
the Federal Courts are confronted with super wicked environmental problems,5 “hot” 
environmental issues6 and the legally-disruptive climate emergency.7 
 
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a brief introduction to the Federal Courts’ 
environmental jurisprudence by highlighting key trends and milestones. Part II turns to central 
principles of environmental law. After introducing the principles of precaution, sustainable 
development and access to (environmental) justice, this part argues that the Courts have 
developed very different doctrinal roles for these principles across different contexts. These 
roles vary from being treated as binding and influential requirements of statutory 
interpretation to justification for specific applications of common law tests to legally-irrelevant 
policy objectives. Part II also highlights instances in which the Courts have actively avoided 
engaging with environmental principles. Part III reflects on what this nascent and uneven 
pattern of environmental principles says about Federal Courts’ culture and what it means for 
the future of federal environmental law at the Federal Courts. 
 
I. Environmental Law at the Federal Courts 
 
The Federal Courts have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over federal environmental decision-
makers. Since the environment is a “diffuse subject that cuts across many different areas of 
constitutional responsibility, some federal, some provincial,”8 federal jurisdiction over the 
environment has been exercised in a piecemeal fashion. This jurisdiction is grounded in a range 
of federal matters notably: fisheries; navigation and shipping; “Indians, and lands reserved for 
the Indians;” federal lands (e.g. national parks); interprovincial undertakings; criminal and 
 
4 Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 
[Scotford] at 4. See also Nicolas DeSadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) [DeSadeleer] at 1-2. 
5 RJ Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future” (2009) 
94 Cornell Law Review 1153. 
6 Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental law as ‘hot’ law,” (2013) 25:3 J Envtl L 347. 
7 Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford, and Emily Barrett, “The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change” (2017) 80 
Modern Law Review 173. 
8 Canada (Attorney General) v Hydro Quebec, [1997] 3 SCR 213, 24 CELR (NS) 167 at para 112. 
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taxation powers; and the peace order and good government clause.9 The Federal Courts’ 
environmental jurisprudence is, accordingly, limited to these matters in which Parliament is 
constitutionally permitted to legislate. This body of Federal Courts caselaw focuses on federal 
environmental assessment (EA), fisheries, pollution and toxics regulation, and protected species 
and spaces.  
 
The vast majority of environmental decisions rendered by the Federal Courts address federal EA 
legislation and regulation. EA is a decision-making practice that requires government agencies 
to assess the potential environmental impacts of a development proposal (e.g. a pipeline) prior 
to granting it an approval for construction and operation. As a planning regime, it requires 
decision-makers to ‘look before they leap’ and consider a wide range of environmental impacts 
prior to rendering a decision. Transparency and public involvement in the process have always 
been of paramount importance in this area of environmental law.10 
 
The Federal Courts have played a transformative role in the development of EA law in Canada 
first by triggering the development of federal EA legislation, and later by shaping its 
implementation in crucial ways. First, the Federal Court catalysed the development of the first 
federal legislated scheme for EA with its 1989 decision, which ruled that the federal 
government’s unevenly-applied, ambiguously-labelled Guidelines Order imposed legally-binding 
assessment obligations on federal departments.11 Justice Cullen ruled that the Guidelines Order 
was “not a mere description of a policy or programme;”12 rather, it was “a duty owed to the 
public – an essential part of the process.”13 This ruling was upheld on appeal to the Federal 
Court of Appeal14 and by the Supreme Court of Canada in subsequent litigation. Resting on a 
foundation of the Federal Courts’ jurisprudence, the Supreme Court, in its seminal decision in 
Friends of the Oldman River, ruled that EA is “a planning tool that is now generally regarded as 
an integral component of sound decision-making.” 15 The Supreme Court affirmed that 
Parliament had ample constitutional scope to implement EA procedures. The road to robust 
federal EA legislation was paved. Since then, however, the Federal Courts’ oversight of this 
legislation and its successor has allowed EA implementation to drift away from its planning 
function. Reasons for this are discussed in Part II.  
 
 
9 The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91, 92(10). 
10 I argue elsewhere that EA is essential to fulfilling the rule of law in the environmental context: Jocelyn Stacey, 
The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018); Jocelyn Stacey, “The 
environmental, democratic, and rule-of-law implications of Harper’s environmental assessment legacy” (2016) 
21:2 Rev Const Stud 165 [Stacey, Harper’s Legacy]. 
11 Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process – A Guide and Critique (Toronto: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2008) [Doelle Federal EA] at 9-10. 
12 Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v Canada (Minister of the Environment), [1989] 3 FC 309, 3 CELR (NS) 287 at 11 
(pinpoints to original format). 
13 Ibid at 14. 
14 Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v Canada (Minister of the Environment) (1989), 27 FTR 159, 4 CELR (NS) 1. 
15 Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3, 88 DLR (4th) 1, at 71.  
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The Federal Courts have played a similarly influential role in protection of endangered species, 
acting as indispensable guardians of the rule of law. The Species at Risk Act (SARA)16 was 
brought into force over a decade after Canada was the first country to sign the international 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Complementing national parks legislation and the Migratory 
Birds Convention Act, national endangered species protection through SARA was needed fulfill 
Canada’s international obligations.  
 
The Federal Courts have played a vital role in ensuring government compliance with SARA. They 
have not shied away from calling out prolonged government foot-dragging. In one early SARA 
decision, Justice Campbell introduced his decision as “a story about the creation and 
application of policy by the Minister in clear contravention of the law, and a reluctance to be 
held accountable for failure to follow the law.”17 Five years later, Justice Mactavish identified 
“an enormous systemic problem within the relevant Ministries” in issuing mandatory recovery 
strategies that were long past their statutory timelines.18 She observed that systemic non-
compliance with binding legislation jeopardized the survival of at-risk species and eroded the 
rule of law.19 
 
The Federal Courts have played a less prominent role in interpreting the legal demands of 
pollution prevention and toxics regulation. This may seem surprising because the federal 
Fisheries Act contains pollution prevention and habitat protection provisions which are stable 
cornerstones of federal environmental law. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), 
which regulates toxic pollution, is “the most comprehensive federal environmental law in 
Canada.”20 Generally speaking, interpretation and enforcement of these statutes’ prohibitions 
occur through criminal proceedings. As these matters proceed through provincial and superior 
courts, the Federal Courts have had fewer opportunities to shape these areas of environmental 
law.  
 
Finally, the Federal Courts’ role in overseeing Canada’s response to climate change is an 
important space to watch. The Federal Courts deflected an early opportunity to play a 
formative role in enforcing Canada’s climate change mitigation obligations when both Courts 
held that seemingly binding substantive provisions in the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act 
were not justiciable.21 This allowed the federal government to explicitly backtrack on Canada’s 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments. The Federal Court similarly ruled that the 
Act posed no constraints on the federal government’s troubling subsequent decision to 
 
16 Species at Risk Act, SC 2002, c 29. 
17 Environmental Defence Canada v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 FC 878, [2009] FCJ No. 1052, 
at para 2. 
18 Western Canada Wilderness Committee v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, 2014 FC 148, 448 FTR 72, 
[Western Canada] at para 85. 
19 Ibid at paras 90-92 and 101. 
20 Duncan Cameron, Annotated Guide to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (Aurora, Ont: Canada Law 
Book, 2004) at I-1.  
21 Friends of the Earth - Les Ami(e)s de la Terre v Canada (Governor in Council), 2008 FC 1183, 299 DLR (4th) 583 
[Friends of the Earth]; Friends of the Earth - Les Ami(e)s de la Terre v Canada (Governor in Council), 2009 FCA 297, 
313 DLR (4th) 767; leave to appeal to SCC dismissed ([2009] SCCA 497). 
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formally withdraw Canada from the Kyoto Protocol.22 Since then, however, the Federal Court 
has upheld the Renewable Fuels Regulations as a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction over 
criminal law,23 a decision that will hopefully deter future federalism challenges from industry on 
any similar fuel regulations. Finally, the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the approvals of the 
Northern Gateway and Trans Mountain Expansion proposals.24 The effect of these decisions has 
been to halt or delay interprovincial pipeline projects that would further entrench Canada’s 
commitment to exploiting the emissions-intensive Alberta oil sands.  
 
Within these general contours of the Federal Courts’ environmental jurisprudence we can now 
turn to doctrinal nuance. Three environmental principles – precaution, sustainable 
development, and access to (environmental) justice – provide insight into how the Federal 
Courts address endemic challenges of environmental law.  
 
II. Environmental Principles at the Federal Courts 
 
Environmental law is a field populated by principles (e.g. prevention, precaution, polluter 
pays).25 There are many theories as to why.26 Plausible hypotheses are that principles promise a 
desirable and functional middle-ground between all-or-nothing determinate rules (e.g. 
complete prohibition on specific pollutants or destructive activities) and open-ended policy 
objectives. Principles have the capacity to guide action while also retaining flexibility needed to 
address the complexity and interconnectedness of ecological systems and human interactions 
within them.27 Principles also focus attention on the life-sustaining capacity of ecological 
systems that produce clean air, clean water, a stable climate, etc., and the unique regulatory 
challenges that come with governing such a vital set of concerns. 
 
The UN’s Stockholm (1972) and Rio (1992) Declarations along with the Brundtland Report 
(1987) helped the rise of environmental principles both in international environmental law and 
in domestic environmental law in jurisdictions around the world.28 In particular, the Rio 
 
22 Turp v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2012 FC 893, [2014] 1 FCR 439. 
23 Syncrude Canada Ltd. v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 776, 461 FTR 53 [Syncrude]; upheld by the Court of 
Appeal though without reference to precaution: Syncrude Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 
160. 
24 Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187, [2016] 4 FCR 418 [Gitxaala Nation]; Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153, [2018] 3 CNLR 205 [Tsleil-Waututh Nation]. 
25 Dworkin’s classic statement that a principle is “a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or 
secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or 
fairness or some other dimension of morality” is relied on by environmental law scholars for positioning 
environmental principles between rules and policies: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977) at 22.  
26 Scotford, supra note 4, summarizes these theories at 30-49. 
27 See, e.g., a discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada’s appreciation of this in: Jerry V. De Marco, “The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Recognition of Fundamental Values: What Could be Next in Canadian Environmental Law?” 
(2007) 17 JELP 159; Charles D. Gonthier (Hon), “Sustainable Development and the Law” (2005) 1 McGill JSDLP 11. 
28 Scotford, supra note 4 at 32-33; Sands, supra note 3 at 38-57. 
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Declaration crystallized specific principles that have come to form a core set of environmental 
principles known around the world, notably:29  
- Sustainable development, which recognizes that social, economic and environmental 
concerns are interlinked and commits to safeguarding resources for future generations; 
- Precaution, the notion that scientific uncertainty should not post-pone cost-effective 
action to prevent environmental harm 
- Polluter pays, that those who pollute should bear its cost; 
- Participation, that environmental decisions are best made with the participation of 
concerned citizens and citizens ought to have the ability to access (environmental) 
justice through information, participation and legal remedies. 
Many of these principles have been adopted in international treaties and in domestic laws 
around the world. Some constitute customary international law.30 
 
The legal status of environmental principles receives considerable attention in environmental 
law scholarship.31 Suffice it to say that, in many jurisdictions, the fact that environmental 
principles are legal principles with precise legal implications is well-documented.32 The 
objective of this chapter is to discern what legal status the Federal Courts have ascribed to 
environmental principles within Canadian law. 
 
This part focuses on three environmental principles, introduced below: the precautionary 
principle, sustainable development and access to (environmental) justice. It argues that these 
environmental principles have played different roles across a range of environmental contexts. 
The Federal Court has begun to elaborate the doctrinal potential of the precautionary principle, 
identifying several distinct legal functions performed by the principle. In contrast, both the 
Federal Court and Court of Appeal have labelled sustainable development a policy objective of 
EA which necessitates judicial deference, and otherwise lacks legal implications. Recent Federal 
Courts’ jurisprudence, which takes an expansive and contextual approach to public interest 
standing and public interests costs, reflects the Courts’ sensitivity to access to justice concerns 
in the environmental context. Finally, this Part identifies instances in which the Courts actively 
avoid engaging with principles. This principle avoidance is signalled by the Courts’ invocation 
 
29 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992) [Rio 
Declaration], principles 1-5, 15, 16, 10, respectively. For a summary of the most commonly known and broadly 
accepted principles see Sands, supra note 3 at Ch 6. 
30 DeSadeleer supra note 4 (polluter pays and prevention) at 26 and 67. Sands, supra note 3 at 279 and 364. See 
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40 [Spraytech] on the 
precautionary principle. 
31 Scotford, supra note 4; Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance 
(New York: Routledge, 2017) [Bosselmann]; DeSadeleer, supra note 4; Sheridan and Lavrysen (eds) Environmental 
Law Principles in Practice (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2002), Stephen Tromans, “High talk and Low Cunning: Putting 
Environmental Principles into Legal Practice”, 1995 JPEL 779.  
32 The specific application of these principles in given cases might be controversial. However, the fact that in many 
instances these principles have legal status is not. Notably, the legal implications of the same nominal principles 
can look quite different in different jurisdictions. See Scotford, supra note 4 at Ch 4 and 5 and DeSadeleer, supra 
note 4, Ch 6. 
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that that “courts are not academies of science,” which counsels a posture of judicial 
submissiveness to environmental decisions. 
 
The analysis of principles that follows provides insight into Federal Courts’ doctrine and culture. 
But an important caveat is first needed. This insight is necessarily tentative and partial because 
it relies only on a close reading of the published decisions of these Courts. It does not, for 
example, consider the litigation strategies of the parties who play the essential role of framing 
disputes and bringing relevant arguments before the courts.33 With that caveat in mind, this 
Part shows that it is possible to delineate distinct doctrinal roles for environmental principles 
and to posit that, where engaged, these principles are doing important work to refine, clarify 
and stabilize the legal obligations created across federal environmental law. 
 
 
A. Precautionary Principle 
 
The precautionary principle addresses the challenge of decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty and the potentially serious and permanent environmental harms that can result 
from such decisions. Its most common formulation is contained in the Rio Declaration: “Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”34 The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the precautionary principle as an 
emerging principle of customary international law.35 
 
The precautionary principle has been mentioned or analysed by the Federal Courts in the 
context of species protection, EA, toxics and fisheries regulation. The principle has been 
ascribed four specific roles: a mandatory principle for statutory interpretation of text that 
codifies the principle and for text that does not; a factor that constrains the reasonable exercise 
of administrative discretion; a principle of constitutional interpretation; and, a misinterpreted 
and therefore unenforceable legal rule.  
 
The most sustained and influential engagement with the precautionary principle has happened 
in the context of enforcing SARA. The Federal Court has recognized that the precautionary 
principle is fundamental to understanding the unlawful delay and obfuscation of the federal 
government. In applying the precautionary principle, Courts have paid particular attention to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, its recognition of the precautionary principle, and 
SARA’s role as a major component of Canada’s implementation of its commitments under 
international law.  
 
33 See, e.g., Affolder, supra note 3. 
34 Rio Declaration, supra note 29. On the incorporation of the precautionary principle into Canadian law, see: 
Spraytech, supra note 30; Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v. Ontario (Environment), 2013 SCC 52 [Castonguay] at para 20 
and the principle’s incorporation and codification in Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37 and 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 [CEAA 2012], Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
SC 1999, c 33 [CEPA], Species At Risk Act, SC 2002, c 29 [SARA], Pest Control Products Act, SC 2002, c 28 [PCPA].  
35 Spraytech, supra note 30 at para 32; Castonguay, supra note 34 at para 20. 
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First, the Federal Court has held that the precautionary principle is a mandatory component of 
statutory interpretation with respect to critical habitat, recovery strategy and emergency 
protection decisions under SARA. In Alberta Wilderness and Environmental Defence, two 2009 
decisions regarding the Greater Sage-Grouse and the Nooksack Dace respectively, the federal 
government attempted to defend its policy of removing known critical habitat from recovery 
strategies and delaying the publication of this information, contrary to the requirements of 
SARA. Both decisions held that the Act’s requirement to include in the recovery strategy “an 
identification of the species’ critical habitat, to the extent possible, based on the best available 
information” had to be interpreted consistently with the precautionary principle.36 This 
interpretation followed from the precautionary mandate of SARA. It meant that there was no 
discretion to withhold information about critical habitat. Justice Campbell held unequivocally 
that the department policy was “in clear contravention of the law.”37  
 
Six years later, Justice Martineau confirmed the mandatory interpretive role for the 
precautionary principle under SARA. He quashed the Minister of Environment’s determination, 
under SARA’s emergency protection powers, that the Western Chorus frog did not face an 
imminent threat despite a provincial development which would eradicate the entire 
metapopulation. The government unsuccessfully argued that the precautionary principle did 
not impose a positive obligation on the Minister. Expanding on prior decisions, Martineau J. 
emphasized that “[t]he precautionary principle applies to material determinations under the 
federal Act.”38 He reasoned that “[t]his principle stands in contrast to administrative or 
ministerial laissez-faire.”39 It “justifies a dynamic and liberal interpretation of the provisions of 
the federal Act… .”40 Here the Minister’s decision failed to apply the precautionary principle 
because it accounted only for a threat to survival and not, as the legislation required, survival 
and recovery.41 The Federal Court again gave specific legal effect to the precautionary principle. 
 
The Federal Court has also found an interpretive role for the precautionary principle in fisheries 
regulation, ruling as unlawful Fisheries and Oceans Canada practice and policy that failed to 
require testing of farmed salmon for disease agents prior to permitting their transfer to open 
ocean operations.42 Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Spraytech and 
 
36 Alberta Wilderness Association v Canada (Minister of Environment), 2009 FC 710, 349 FTR 63 
[Alberta Wilderness] at para 25; Environmental Defence Canada v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 
FC 878, 349 FTR 225 [Environmental Defence] at para 40. 
37 Environmental Defence, supra note 36 at para 2. 
38 Quebec Center for Environmental Law v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2015 FC 773, 483 FTR 147 
[Quebec Center] at para 76. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid at para 7.  
41 See also Adam v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2011 FC 962, 62 CELR (3d) 218, and Western Canada, 
supra note 18 for additional decisions that address statutory interpretation of SARA in a manner consistent with 
the precautionary principle. 
42 Morton v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2015 FC 575, 480 FTR 148 [Morton 2015] and Morton v 
Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2019 FC 143, 27 CELR (4th) 31 [Morton 2019]. See Pierre Cloutier de 
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Castonguay, Justice Rennie reasoned that “the precautionary principle is at a minimum, an 
established aspect of statutory interpretation, and arguably, has crystallized into a norm of 
customary international and substantive domestic law.”43 The compulsory interpretive role of 
the precautionary principle thus informed Rennie J.’s enforcement of the Fishery (General) 
Regulations, which allows the approval of a fish transfer (of farmed fish) to open ocean only if 
“the [transferred] fish do not have any disease or disease agent that may be harmful to the 
protection and conservation of fish.”44  Justice Rennie held that he was not ruling on the merits 
of the scientific debate. “Rather, the argument having been raised, and the assertion made that 
the conditions reflect a precautionary approach to aquaculture, the issue had to be 
considered.”45 He held that the regulatory provision “embodies the precautionary principle,” 
and that the fish transfer license and its conditions therefore “cannot derogate from the 
precautionary principle.”46  Justice Strickland applied this ruling on the precautionary principle 
when, four years later, she quashed the unlawful continuation of the no-testing policy and 
emphasized that the department policy derogated from the precautionary principle.47  
 
Secondly, the Federal Court has found that the precautionary principle acts as a mandatory 
constraint on the reasonableness of discretionary and factual determinations. In quashing the 
Minister of Health’s decision to not initiate a re-evaluation of a particular pesticide under the 
Pest Control Products Act, Justice Kelen succinctly noted that the Minister failed to comply with 
the precautionary principle. Despite scientific debate over the environmental impacts of the 
pesticide, the Minister determined that the pesticide did not present an unacceptable risk. 
Kelen J. held that “the precautionary principle would require that the Minister initiate a special 
review”48 and that the Minister’s determination was not justified, transparent or intelligible 
because it did not address the environmental risk to amphibians.49  
 
In the environmental assessment context, Justice Phelan upheld as reasonable the review 
panel’s rejection of the industry proponent’s “vague assurances” about future adaptive 
management which led to a finding of significant adverse environmental effects. Phelan J. 
stated the Panel’s finding, “was entirely reasonable, and in line with the Panel’s (reasonable) 
interpretation of the precautionary principle.”50 The precautionary principle has thus come to 
shape the scope of reasonable decision-making across a range of environmental decisions.  
 
Repentigny, “Precaution, sub-delegation and aquaculture regulation: Morton v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans)” 
(2015) 28 JELP 125. 
43 Morton 2015, supra note 42 at para 43. 
44 Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR/93-53, s. 56. 
45 Morton 2015, supra note 42 at para 47. 
46 Ibid at paras 97-98. 
47 Morton 2019, supra note 42 at (in particular) paras 159, 165, 170. 
48 Weir v Canada (Minister of Health), 2011 FC 1322, 400 FTR 212 at para 101.  
49 Ibid at paras 105-106. See also Alberta Wilderness supra note 36, where the Court holds the determination to be 
unreasonable (tacitly relying on the precautionary principle invoked in other places in the judgment). 
50 Taseko Mines Limited v. Canada (Environment), 2017 FC 1009, 287 ACWS (3d) 411 [Taseko Mines 2017] at paras 
122-123 (upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal without comment on the precautionary principle: 2019 FCA 319 
[Taseko Mines 2019]). Morton 2015 and Morton 2019, supra note 42 demonstrate that courts must be willing to 
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Third, the Federal Court has used the precautionary principle to inform its determination of the 
pith and substance of a federal regulation when determining its constitutional validity.51 A pith 
and substance analysis requires the consideration of the purpose and effects of the impugned 
law. Justice Zinn held that the precautionary principle is relevant to considering the effects of 
environmental provisions. He reasoned that,  
[t]here is nothing unconstitutional about Parliament taking steps to address the 
threat of [greenhouse gases] in the way it thought best, based on the evidence 
available to it at the time… as the preamble to CEPA states, Parliament must act 
to address environmental threats on the best evidence available at the time 
and not await scientific certainty.52 
The precautionary principle helped to ensure that the Court interpreted the effects of the 
regulation in a constitutionally appropriate matter. The principle guarded against the risk of 
judicial overreaching by second-guessing the efficacy of the enhanced pollution standard in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.53  
 
Finally, the precautionary principle has also, on occasion, been the subject of misinterpretation. 
In Pembina Institute, the Federal Court understood the principle as a blunt tool that has 
“potentially paralyzing effects,”54 which suggests that any uncertainty about potential serious 
and irreversible effects would prevent a project from being approved.55 This concern is 
overblown, in large measure, because it fails to account for the structure of EA legislation which 
does not outright prohibit the approval of environmentally-harmful development projects. In 
contrast, Justice Russell articulated a more justified, fine-grained role for the precautionary 
principle under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.56 Russell J. reasoned along the 
lines of the SARA decisions: the precautionary principle informed the reasonableness of the 
implementation of specific requirements under the Act. It did not operate as a rule that 
paralyzed development; rather, it required a level of detail and transparency in the assessment 
 
scrutinize whether decision-makers’ proclaimed precautionary approaches are reasonably supported as 
precautionary.  
51 Syncrude, supra note 23. 
52 Ibid at para 48. 
53 In this way, it refined the application of Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 17 at para 18 for 
environmental legislation and regulation. 
54 Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302, 323 FTR 297 
 at para 32; Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2003 FCA 197, 
[2003] 4 FC 672 at para 24. 
55 For commentary on the Pembina decision’s use of precaution, see: Nathalie Chalifour, “A (Pre) Cautionary Tale 
About the Kearl Oil Sands Decision: The Significance of Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development, et al. v. 
Canada (Attorney-General) for the Future of Environmental Assessment” (2009) 5 McGill Int’l J Sust Dev L & Pol’y 
251. Many EA decisions simply reference the principle in passing but ascribe no legally relevant role to it: see, for 
example, Tsleil Waututh Nation, supra note 24; Nunatsiavut v Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans), 2015 
FC 492, 478 FTR 240 at paras 39-40; Group Maison Candiac Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FC 643, 19 CELR 
(4th) 193 at para 13. 
56 Greenpeace Canada v Canada, 2014 FC 463, 455 FTR 1 especially at paras 237, 331 and 382 [Greenpeace 2014]. 
For analysis, see Martin Olszynski, “Environmental Assessment as Planning and Disclosure Tool: Greenpeace 
Canada v Canada (AG),” (2015) 38 Dalhousie L J 207. See also, Taseko Mines 2017, supra note 50. 
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that allowed such consequential decisions to be made in a democratically accountable manner. 
While this decision was overturned by a split Federal Court of Appeal, the appellate decision did 
not engage with Russell J.’s specific reasoning on the precautionary principle.57  
 
This section has shown that the Federal Court has begun to articulate several distinct and 
promising legal roles for the precautionary principle in Canadian environmental law. This 
development has not been uniform, with SARA decisions leading this doctrinal evolution. 
Nonetheless, in most instances when the Federal Court has engaged with the principle it has 
sought to give it specific legal effect. 
 
B. Sustainable Development 
 
Sustainable development, the idea that “development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations,”58 makes at least 
three demands of environmental decisions. First, that the economic and social aspects of 
development decisions must be integrated with environmental considerations. Second, it 
addresses the fact that development and environmental needs are not distributed evenly over 
geography and time. Therefore, sustainable development requires regard to intergenerational 
equity (i.e. the needs of future generations) along with the role of sustainable development in 
lifting communities out of poverty. Third, some formulations of sustainable development 
contain the idea of an ecological baseline.59 This is the idea that development decisions are 
sustainable only if they allow ecosystems to sustain themselves over time and retain their 
natural character.60 Protecting ecological baselines goes a step further than integration, 
ensuring that long-term environmental considerations are protected in a fundamentally life-
sustaining way and are not overshadowed by near-term economic concerns.  
 
Sustainable development is intertwined with EA and its concerns have been addressed by all 
iterations of federal EA, beginning with the earliest and most inchoate federal policy.61 CEAA 
2012, defined sustainable development consistently with international definitions as 
“development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future 
 
57 See discussion of this decision in the text surrounding note 97 below. 
58 Rio Declaration, supra note 29 at Principle 3. Sustainable development is described in the literature as a principle 
(Sands, supra note 3), a meta-principle (Vaughn Lowe, “Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments” 
in A Boyle and D Freestone, eds, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 19 at 31 and its own body of law [Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger 
and Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004)]  
59 World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development: Our Common Future, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), at Ch 8 para 47, Overview para 27, Ch 
2 para 9. For foreign interpretation, see the New Zealand Supreme Court’s decision in Environmental Defence 
Society Inc. v The New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 38. 
60 See, e.g., Bosselmann supra note 31 at ch1 (on ecological sustainability as the core of sustainable development). 
61 Provisions of the Policy of the Government of Canada Establishing the Federal Environmental Assessment and 
Review Process (Ottawa: Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, 1974). See also CEAA supra note 76, s. 
4(1)(h); Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1 [IAA], s 6(1)(a).  
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generations to meet their own needs.”62 The Newfoundland Court of Appeal has eloquently 
captured the connection between EA legislation and the demands of sustainable development, 
stating:  
these statutes represent a public attempt to develop an appropriate response 
that takes account of the forces which threaten the existence of the 
environment. If the rights of future generations to the protection of the 
present integrity of the natural world are to be taken seriously, and not to be 
regarded as mere empty rhetoric, care must be taken in the interpretation and 
application of the legislation. Environmental laws must be construed against 
their commitment to future generations and against a recognition that, in 
addressing environmental issues, we often have imperfect knowledge as to the 
potential impact of activities on the environment. One must also be alert to the 
fact that governments themselves, even strongly pro-environment ones, are 
subject to many countervailing social and economic forces, sometimes 
legitimate and sometimes not. Their agendas are often influenced by non-
environmental considerations. 
 
The legislation, if it is to do its job, must therefore be applied in a manner that 
will counteract the ability of immediate collective economic and social forces to 
set their own environmental agendas. It must be regarded as something more 
than a mere statement of lofty intent. It must be a blueprint for protective 
action.63 
 
This reasoning strongly reflects the three demands of sustainable development and thus 
provides a useful benchmark for evaluating the decisions of the Federal Courts. The 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal recognizes that EA decisions have intergenerational implications 
and therefore must attend to the right of future generations to not bear disproportionate 
environmental harms. It observes that integrating economic, social and environmental 
considerations carries the risk that “countervailing social and economic forces” tend to easily 
overshadow environmental concerns; therefore, courts play an important role in counteracting 
the effect of these forces on the administration of legislative responsibilities. It recognizes that 
the “existence of the environment” is at stake and that EA laws must protect the basic integrity 
of ecological systems. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal understands these demands in legal 
terms – they must shape the interpretation and administration of environmental statutes.  
 
This line of reasoning has not influenced the Federal Courts’ jurisprudence. The limited explicit 
engagement with the principle by the Federal Courts suggests they understand sustainable 
development as a policy goal, not as a legally relevant principle that informs the obligations for 
how public decision-makers achieve it. When the language of sustainable development is 
 
62 CEAA 2012, supra note 34, s2(1). Notably, its successor replaces this definition with a more specific definition of 
“sustainability”, yet to be interpreted by the Courts: IAA, supra note 61, s 1. 
63 Labrador Inuit Association v. Newfoundland (Minister of Environment and Labour) (1997), 1997 CanLII 14612 (NL 
CA), 152 DLR (4th) 50 (NLCA) paras 11-12. 
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explicitly invoked by the Federal Courts it tends to be as a justification for judicial non-
interference. For example, in Bow Valley, the Federal Court considered whether the proposal to 
upgrade resort facilities in Banff National Park complied with the federal EA requirements. The 
Court correctly observed that the purpose of the Act, “is to ensure the integration of 
environmental factors into planning and decision-making processes so as to promote 
sustainable development in a coordinated manner.” However, it went on to state:  
The objective of the legislation therefore, is not to prevent any or all development of 
environmentally sensitive areas, but to balance that development against the unique 
ecological circumstances of the area in question. When dealing with this type of 
legislative objective, the Court must be sensitive to the limited scope of its judicial 
review power.64 
In contrast to the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, this Federal Court reasoning converts the 
sustainable development demand of integration into a balancing exercise between economic 
and environmental considerations. Construed as such, it follows that the Court should defer to 
such a policy-laden determination. Unfortunately, alternative definitions and specific doctrinal 
roles for the demand of integration are left unexplored.  
 
The Canada National Parks Act imposes a clear duty on the Minister maintain ecological 
integrity as a “first priority” in parks management.65 This legislative language would seem to 
give a specific legal dimension to the third demand of sustainable development. Yet the Federal 
Courts interpreted this requirement as one of many policy objectives. The Federal Court and 
Court of Appeal upheld the Minister’s decision to approve a winter road through Wood Buffalo 
National Park, a vulnerable UNESCO world heritage site, despite the Minister failing to 
reference – let alone explain – how the decision was consistent with maintaining ecological 
integrity.66 The Courts viewed this decision as a balancing exercise between social, economic 
and ecological factors; accordingly, it was not for the Courts to reweigh.67 
 
The Federal Courts cannot, however, entirely bracket sustainable development as a policy 
objective and thereby avoid engaging with its demands. Since EA legislation prescribes how 
federal decision-makers plan future development, judicial review of these decisions is 
necessarily about the interpretive and administrative dimensions of sustainable development 
contained in the legislation. Even when the Federal Courts avoid the language of sustainable 
development, they cannot avoid its demands of integration, intergenerational equity and 
protecting ecological baselines. In other words, judicial deference is not a neutral position on 
sustainable development given the structure of the legislation. The result of the Federal Courts’  
 
64 Bow Valley Naturalists Society v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) (1999), 91 ACWS (3d) 763, 175 FTR 122 
at para 25. The Federal Court of Appeal reiterated this point when it upheld the Federal Court’s decision: Bow 
Valley Naturalists Society v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2001] CanLII 22029 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 461, at 
para 77. See also Tsawwassen Indian Band v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2001 FCA 58, 37 CELR (NS) 182 at para 
11 noting that sustainable development is the policy goal of EA legislation. 
65 Canada National Parks Act, SC 2000, c 32, s 8(2). 
66 Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v. Copps, 2001 FCT 1123 (CanLII) and Canadian Parks and Wilderness 
Society v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2003 FCA 197 [Wood Buffalo].  
67 Ibid. para 52 and para 99, in the respective decisions. 
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lack of explicit engagement with sustainable development is an interpretive approach that 
allows EA implementation to drift away from its legislated mandate. 
 
Take the example of integration. The integration of economic, social and environmental 
concerns is embedded in a series of essential decisions taken under the federal EA regime. First, 
federal decision-makers must determine the appropriate scope of the project to be assessed. 
Under CEAA 1995, some decision-makers adopted a narrow scoping practice that determined 
‘the project’ to be only the component that required a federal permit. For example, if the 
proposed project was a forestry operation with roads and a bridge, these decision-makers 
would purport to exercise discretion to determine only the bridge (which would require a 
federal fisheries or navigation permit) was subject to a federal assessment.68 This narrow 
determination of project scope undermines the demand of integration. When the project scope 
fails to include the primary development – the forestry operation – of the proposal, it becomes 
impossible to integrate economic and social considerations (related to forestry development) 
with environmental factors. The EA is reduced to a technical, regulatory hurdle rather than 
serving as a planning process that seeks to resolve interrelated economic, social and 
environmental concerns. 
 
Federal Court and Court of Appeal decisions upheld this practice as consistent with the Act. 
These decisions did not rely on the contextual and purposive statutory analysis evident in the 
SARA decisions. When presented with arguments on how the scope of the project affects 
integration, the Federal Court of Appeal held “I see nothing in the words of the CEAA that 
makes that a requirement in every case.”69 The result was that much of federal EA was 
rendered duplicative of existing regulatory processes under, for example, the Fisheries Act.70 
According to this line of Federal Courts caselaw, fulfilling the “planning function” of EA law and 
encouraging “actions that promote sustainable development” were left entirely to the 
discretion of executive actors implementing the Act. 
 
Similarly, the EA requires that decision-makers demonstrate that proposals with “significant 
adverse effects are justified in the circumstances” before granting an EA. Reviewing these 
decisions for their compliance with this requirement again necessarily implicates sustainable 
development’s demand of integration.71 While one would not expect a reviewing judge to 
 
68 The Supreme Court of Canada (upholding the Federal Court) held in 2010 that federal decision-makers could 
only increase the scope of the project beyond that proposed and they could not decrease the scope (e.g., to only 
include the portion that triggered federal jurisdiction): MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & 
Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 SCR 6. Prior to this decision, however, there were numerous Federal Court and Court 
of Appeal decisions on scoping. For summary and commentary, see Doelle Federal EA, supra note 11 at 121-136. 
69 Prairie Acid Rain Coalition v Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 2006 FCA 31, [2006] 3 FCR 610 at para 37. 
See also Friends of the West Country Association v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) [2000] 2 FC 263, 169 
FTR 298 at para 22. See Quebec (Attorney General v Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 SCR 159, [1994] 3 
CNLR 49, at para 60 for a different conclusion on scoping, holding that “I would find it surprising that such an 
elaborate review process would be created for such a limited inquiry.” 
70 Doelle Federal EA supra note 11 at 132-3. 
71 It also implicates the demands of intergenerational equity and ecological baselines, both of which the Courts 
could require the decision-maker to explicit attend to in its justification. 
Chapter 13 Environmental Law, in Craig Forcese et al, eds, Federal Courts 50th Anniversary 
(Irwin Law, forthcoming) 
 15 
lightly second-guess the justification offered, ensuring that the justification obligation is fulfilled 
within the meaning of the Act is properly the function of the Court. Unfortunately, the Federal 
Courts have shown exceptional deference to these decisions and have not required reasons 
that transparently evidence integration of environmental, social and economic concerns. 
Indeed, the Federal Court upheld the Site C Dam approval as meeting the “justification” legal 
requirement despite the decision not referencing any of the identified significant 
environmental effects,72 the greatest number of negative effects identified in the history of 
Canadian EA law.73   
 
This section has argued that the Federal Courts’ treatment of sustainable development as mere 
policy objective does not allow the courts to avoid engaging with its underlying concerns. 
Integration, ecological baselines and intergenerational equity are bound up in the 
interpretation and implementation of the legislation. Embracing sustainable development as an 
interpretive framework for EA law and developing incrementally the specific doctrinal roles for 
the principle would allow the many strands of EA caselaw to develop in a more coherent and 
purposeful manner.  
 
C. Access to Environmental Justice 
 
Access to environmental justice is also a central environmental principle. The Rio Declaration 
recognizes that: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities …and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial 
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be 
provided.74  
Access to information, participation in decision-making and access to legal remedies comprise 
the commitment to access to environmental justice. Some of these features are incorporated 
 
72 Even the press release issued after the Order in Council failed to reference these effects, but the Court found 
both were legally sufficient: Peace Valley Landowner Association v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1027, 97 
CELR (3d) 1 [Peace Valley] at para 66. See also: Gitxaala Nation, supra note 24 at para 155 (“widest margin of 
appreciation over these questions”), but compare with Tsleil-Waututh Nation, supra note 24 at para 481-2 (where 
the Court of Appeal did examine the reasons offered as justification). 
73 Water Governance Project, “Briefing Note #2: Assessing Alternatives to Site C (Environmental Effects 
Comparison) at 4, online: Water Governance Project http://watergovernance.ca/category/site-c-dam/. 
74 Rio Declaration, supra note 29 at Principle 10; Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, 
(entered into force 29 December 1993), Part 13; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 
447 (entered into force 20 October 2001). Canada is not a party to this agreement. The stated rationale is because 
“Canada maintains a well-established system of engaging the public.” Available online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-
organizations/convention-access-information-public-participation-aarhus-convention-kiev-protocol.html>.) 
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into federal environmental statutes. For example, CEPA requires polluters to report on 
pollution release, which is posted to the National Pollution Release Inventory.75 Many 
environmental statutes create online registries to which regulatory developments must be 
posted for easy public access.76 Federal EA provides crucial opportunities for public input on a 
range of environmental issues that is typically lacking in other Canadian jurisdictions and areas 
of environmental regulation.77 And since there is no federal environmental appeals tribunal, 
access to a legal remedy is through statutory appeal or judicial review to the Federal Courts. 
 
This part focuses on access to the Federal Courts through the public interest standing and 
public interest costs doctrines. First, we will see the Federal Courts have come to develop the 
public interest standing doctrine in a contextual manner that facilitates access to environmental 
justice. Second, the public interest costs test applied by the Courts has the potential to help 
fulfill the promise of access to (environmental) justice. 
 
First, the availability of public interest standing plays a gatekeeping function that impacts the 
availability of legal remedies for environmental harms. Harms to land, air, water, non-human 
species are often temporally and geographically diffuse. To rely on direct standing – the fact of 
sufficiently-motivated and resourced individuals who experience direct harm to their health or 
property – to challenge federal decisions would significantly reduce the availability of legal 
remedies. As Justice Evans explained,  
since the public interest in the global environment is very fragmented, public 
interest groups with a relevant track record will often be the only likely litigants 
willing and able to institute legal proceedings to ensure that statutory duties are 
discharged by the public officials upon whom they have been imposed.78 
 
The Federal Courts have taken a generous approach to granting public interest standing in the 
environmental context. The test to attain public interest standing requires: (i) a serious issue to 
be tried, (ii) the claimant to have a genuine interest in the matter, and (iii) that the claim is, all 
things considered, a reasonable and effective way to bring the matter before the courts.79 For 
environmental NGOs and committed community groups and citizens, public interest standing 
no longer poses a significant legal barrier.  
 
75 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, s 95(1) – (8), interpreted and enforced in Great Lakes 
United v Canada (Minister of Environment), 2009 FC 408, 346 FTR 106. For commentary on this regime, see Greg 
Simmons, “Clearing the Air? Information Disclosure, Systems of Power and the National Pollution Release 
Inventory” (2013) 59:1 McGill L J 10, 25. 
76 IAA, supra note 61, ss 104-105; CEAA 2012, supra note 34, s. 78(1) – (3); SARA, supra note 34, s. 120; PCPA, supra 
note 34, s. 42(7). 
77 See, e.g., Shaun Fluker, “The Right to Public Participation in Resources and Environmental Decision-Making in 
Alberta” (2015) 52 Alberta Law Review 567. 
78 Sierra Club of Canada v Minister of Finance, [1999] 2 FC 211, 157 FTR 123 [Sierra Club] at para 54.  
79 Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, 
[2012] 2 SCR 524. The majority of the Federal Court and Court of Appeal cases considered here applied the Finlay 
version of the test, for which the third part required showing there was no other reasonable and effective way to 
bring the matter before the Court (Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 SCR 607, [1987] 1 WWR 603 at 
para 39). 
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This was not inevitable. In applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s tripartite test, the Federal 
Courts had to grapple with the language of the Federal Courts Act. Subsection 18.1(1) of the Act 
allows “anyone directly affected by the matter…” to bring an application for judicial review.80 
The Federal Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, held that this provision preserved the 
discretion of the Court to “grant standing when it is convinced that the particular circumstances 
of the case and the type of interest which the applicant holds justify status being granted.”81  
 
The tripartite public interest standing test has played an important role in shaping the Federal 
Courts environmental jurisprudence, with many of the most influential decisions having been 
launched by public interest litigants. All along the Federal Courts have taken a contextual 
approach to its application that looks for serious engagement on the part of the claimant with 
the environmental matters at stake.82 This approach recognizes the many ways in which 
environmental concerns are represented in the public sphere and acknowledges that it is 
unnecessary to maintain additional legal barriers to seeking legal remedies in the 
environmental context. The Federal Courts have consistently rejected spurious arguments to 
deny standing based on physical location,83 political motivation,84 novelty of the organization,85 
and hypothetical alternative claimants.86 Challenges to the standing of environmental claimants 
have diminished87 and this test no longer poses a significant barrier to attaining environmental 
remedies through judicial review. 
 
Second, a principled approach to public interest costs is necessary to realize the goals of a 
generous public interest standing doctrine. One of the greatest barriers to accessing 
(environmental) justice is the threat of an adverse costs award that requires a public interest 
litigant to bear the legal costs of the government respondent and any private parties who have 
joined the litigation.88  
 
80 Federal Courts Act, RSC, 1985, c. F-7, S 18.1(1) emphasis added. 
81 Friends of the Island Inc. v Canada (Minister of Public Works), [1993] 2 FC 229, 10 CELR (NS) 204 at 46; affirmed 
by FCA in Sunshine Village Corp. v. Superintendent of Banff National Park (1996), 44 Admin. L.R. (2d) 201, 65 ACWS 
(3d) 437. Note that government parties continued to argue that the test did not apply until Sierra Club, supra note 
78 (but see also Communities and Coal Society and Voters Taking Action on Climate Change v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2018 FC 35, 288 ACWS (3d) 5 [Communities and Coal])) industry parties continued to bring standing 
challenges much longer (e.g. MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 2007 FC 955, 33 
C.E.L.R. (3d) 1 [MiningWatch 2007]). 
82 One notable exception is Shiell v Canada (Atomic Energy Control Board) (1995), 17 CELR (NS) 286, 98 FTR 75 in 
which the court seems to have misunderstood the standing test from Finlay. This error is cabined by subsequent 
cases: Citizens Mining Council of Newfoundland and Labrador Inc. v Canada (Minister of Environment) (1999), 29 
CELR (NS) 117, 163 FTR 36 [Citizens Mining] at para 34; Environmental Resource Centre v Canada (Minister of 
Environment), 2001 FCT 1423, 45 CELR (NS) 114 at paras 134-135. 
83 MiningWatch 2007, supra note 81 at para 183. 
84 Sierra Club, supra note 78 at para 58. 
85 Citizens Mining, supra note 82; Communities and Coal, supra note 81. 
86 Citizens Mining, supra note 82 at para 35. 
87 E.g. Sandy Pond Alliance to Protect Canadian Waters Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 1112, 81 CELR 
(3d) 175. 
88 Chris Tollefson, “Costs in Public Interest Litigation Revisited” (2011) 39 Advocate’s Q 197. 
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While the Federal Courts’ public interest costs jurisprudence has lagged behind its standing 
jurisprudence, recent decisions have crafted a doctrine that is capable of supporting more 
robust access to environmental remedies. These recent decisions apply Harris, a decision in 
which Justice Dawson adopted a set of criteria that “recognizes that absent an award of costs 
public interest status may be of theoretical but not practical effect.”89  In broad strokes, these 
criteria require the court to consider the public benefit of the litigation, the financial 
circumstances of the parties, and the parties’ conduct in the litigation proceedings. While, in 
the majority of environmental decisions post-Harris the losing party bears an adverse costs 
award, there are some promising applications of the public interest costs doctrine in the 
environmental context. 
 
For example, in Georgia Strait Alliance, Justice Russell awarded the environmental claimants 
solicitor-client costs (nearly four-times the amount set out in the party-party costs tariff). 
Russell J.’s ruling was grounded squarely in access to environmental justice concerns. He 
reasoned that an enhanced costs award was justified because “the nature of species-at-risk 
legislation is such that only through the efforts of human champions will issues of ambiguity in, 
or failures to apply or enforce, the law be addressed.”90 Furthermore, the Court held that 
government respondent “adopted an unjustifiably evasive and obstructive approach to these 
proceedings for no other purpose than to thwart the Applicants’ attempts to bring important 
public issues before the Court.” Georgia Strait Alliance demonstrates the role of costs rulings in 
upholding the rule of law in the environmental context. Beginning with granting public interest 
standing, through the interpretation of SARA, to awarding costs, the Federal Court has enforced 
species-at-risk legislation in a manner consistent with environmental principles.91  
 
 
D. Principle Avoidance 
 
Despite the promising tendrils of principle development discussed so far, the vast majority of 
decisions do not explicitly engage with environmental principles. This means there are 
numerous missed opportunities for developing federal environmental law in a nuanced and 
coherent way. One distinctive set of missed opportunities is flagged by the Courts through their 
oft-repeated expression that the “courts are not academies of science.” This platitude is 
invoked roughly as frequently as the precautionary principle and it has come to shape an 
exceptionally deferential stance taken by the Federal Courts when applying the standard of 
 
89 Harris v R, [2002] 2 FC 484, 214 FTR 1 at para 223. 
90 Georgia Strait Alliance v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2011, 59 CELR (3d) 103. 
91 Similarly, the Federal Courts often decline to order costs against unsuccessful public interest claimants. See: 
Peace Valley, supra note 72. See also Grand Riverkeeper, Labrador Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 
1520, 422 FT. 299 at para 71; Gray v Canada, 2019 FC 301, 306 ACWS (3d) 310 at para 156; Ecology Action Centre v 
Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1087, 262 FTR 160; Forestethics Advocacy v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 
FCA 71, 390 DLR (4th) 376 at para 19; Amis de la Rivière Kipawa v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 1267, 318 
FTR 76 at para 92; Living Oceans Society v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 FC 848, 180 ACWS (3d) 
9 at para 12.  
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reasonableness to decisions under, in particular, EA legislation. This section suggests that the 
“academies of science” phrase signals a judicial unwillingness to engage with environmental 
principles.92  
 
The expression that courts are not academies of science has an innocuous origin that had 
nothing to do with the substance of environmental or administrative law. The Federal Court 
invoked the expression in response to a government party’s confused request to have a judicial 
review application converted to a full trial so that the Court could fully review the evidence and 
decide the matter on its merits. Justice Strayer wrote:  
It is not the role of the Court in these proceedings to become an academy of science to 
arbitrate conflicting scientific predictions, or to act as a kind of legislative upper 
chamber to weigh expressions of public concern and determine which ones should be 
respected…[T]hey are not the roles conferred upon it in the exercise of judicial review 
under section 18 of the Federal Courts Act. I am therefore not going to direct that this 
matter be tried by way of an action.93 
The idea that courts are not academies of science was thus used to delineate between civil 
actions and judicial review.94 It is understandable that the Court would respond to such a basic 
misunderstanding by counsel by invoking the trite observation that courts are not scientific 
bodies which step into the shoes of decision-makers. It was not, however, a statement on the 
correct approach to conducting judicial review or an attempt to clarify contemporary anxieties 
about the intensity or scope of the standard of reasonableness. 
 
Since then, the phrase has become just this. Sometimes this phrase is invoked and then 
rejected as the Court reaffirms its role in ensuring that discretion is exercised in accordance 
with statutory requirements,95 and to ensure that “the right to judicial review… [is not turned 
into] a hollow one.”96 However, more recently the Federal Court of Appeal reasoned that, since 
it is not “an academy of science” it could only intervene in an EA decision if the assessment 
gave “no consideration at all” to the specific environmental effects.97 The result of such a 
submissive stance, which is often taken by the Court in EA decisions, is that an unsupported 
conclusion or an environmental effect treated as beneficial rather than harmful would be 
upheld as reasonable. 
 
92 These are not the only instances of principle avoidance, only the ones that are distinguished by the Court’s 
rhetorical indication that they are not “academies of science.” Other crucial missed opportunities for principle 
engagement are: Friends of the Earth, supra note 21, Wood Buffalo, supra note 66 and Burns Bog Conservation 
Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 1024, 417 FTR 98. 
93 Vancouver Island Peace Society v Canada, [1992] 3 FC 42, 53 FTR 300 at 8. 
94 See also Martin Olszynski and Meinhard Doelle, “Ontario Power Generation Inc. v Greenpeace Canada: Form 
over Substance Leads to a ‘Low Threshold’ for Federal Environmental Assessment” (22 Sept 2015) ABLawg, online: 
<https://ablawg.ca/2015/09/22/ontario-power-generation-inc-v-greenpeace-canada-form-over-substance-leads-
to-a-low-threshold-for-federal-environmental-assessment>. 
95 Nunavut Tunngavik Inc v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) (1998), 162 DLR (4th) 625 (FCA) at para 55. 
96 Inverhuron & District Ratepayers' Association v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2001 FCA 203, 39 CELR 
(NS) 161 at para 37. 
97 Ontario Power Generation Inc. v Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186, 95 CELR (3d) 1, at para 130. Affirmed in 
Taseko Mines 2019, supra note 50 at para 68. 
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A closer examination of these decisions reveals that the Courts tend to use the “academy of 
science” phrase as a shield to avoid engaging with environmental principles. In Mountain Parks, 
for example, the Federal Court was asked to consider whether an approval of water 
withdrawals from Banff National Park was consistent with the National Parks Act’s “first 
priority” of ecological integrity, a defined term under the Act.98 Ecological integrity is a principle 
enshrined in the Act, ostensibly binding on decision-makers. However, the Court characterized 
the claim as “an attack on the evidence that was before the decision-maker” and stated that “a 
reviewing court should decline to allow itself to become an academy of science called upon to 
weigh conflicting statements about the maintenance or restoration of ecological integrity so as 
to determine which statement is correct.”99 The absent role of ecological integrity as a legal 
principle led the Court to characterize the dispute as exclusively evidentiary, rather than as a 
dispute about the lawful exercise of delegated power. 
 
The cluster of Federal Court and Court of Appeal decisions that have proliferated the “academy 
of science” phrase dovetails with the reluctance to explicitly engage the principle of sustainable 
development and precautionary principle in EA decisions as discussed above.  Unrefined by 
precaution and sustainable development, EA legislation may appear to create pockets of 
scientific analysis and open-ended discretion. Understood as such, it is no surprise courts are 
reluctant to intervene. But the nature of those pockets of delegated authority is shaped by the 
interpretation of the legal frameworks they are embedded within. As we have seen, 
environmental principles can play an important role in law interpretation and setting legal 
standards for review.  
 
Lacuna in the development of environmental principles in Federal Courts jurisprudence mean 
that challenges to environmental decisions are often perceived as essentially evidentiary or 
factual concerns, not suitable for reviewing courts. As we have seen above, environmental 
principles have established doctrinal roles in informing statutory and constitutional 
interpretation, constraining the exercise of discretion and justifying the application of common 
law tests, all of which are the bread-and-butter of judicial review. Continued elaboration and 
diffusion of environmental principles across all areas of federal environmental law can help 
ensure that the right to judicial review does not ring hollow. At present, however, the 
repetition of the bromide that “courts are not academies of science” highlights judicial 
avoidance of environmental principles.  
 
III. Doctrine, Culture & the Future of Environmental Law in the Federal Courts 
 
The nascent and imperfect development of environmental principles offers insight into the 
culture of the Federal Courts and their own understanding of their role in Canada’s 
 
98 Canadian National Parks Act, S.C. 2000, c. 32, s 8(2). 
99 Mountain Parks Watershed Assn. v Chateau Lake Louise Corp., 2004 FC 1222, 263 FTR 12, at para 15. See also 
Wood Buffalo, supra note 66. 
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constitutional order. It also forms the basis for some observations about how well the existing 
environmental law jurisprudence equips the Federal Courts to grapple with the pressing legal 
challenges that continue to arise in the environmental context. 
 
Principles & Judicial Culture 
 
The evolution of environmental principles at the Federal Courts reflects two features of the 
Federal Courts of Canada: they are specialist courts in judicial review but they are not specialist 
courts in environmental law. Environmental principles provide specific context for 
understanding the influence of these two institutional features on doctrine and culture at the 
Federal Courts.  
 
The Federal Courts are experts in judicial review.100 The vast majority of cases heard by the 
Courts are applications for judicial review or statutory appeals, rather than civil litigation 
against federal bodies. This means that the Courts’ engagements with environmental principles 
happen in this appropriately constrained role as a reviewing court. In this way, the Federal 
Courts differ from other notable judicial institutions which have developed a rich jurisprudence 
around environmental principles. The New South Wales Land and Environment Court, for 
example, has the opportunity to develop environmental principles when reviewing decisions for 
their merits and this has informed the role of principles in judicial review as well.101 In contrast, 
the Federal Courts have had limited opportunity to engage with environmental principles in the 
context of civil litigation. Perhaps experience reasoning with environmental principles directly 
in civil litigation, should these cases arise, might lead the Courts to see the analytical 
possibilities for principles in the context of judicial review. 
 
As Part II has demonstrated, there are important doctrinal roles for environmental principles in 
judicial review. Interestingly, the principles reveal tensions in the Courts’ jurisprudence about 
their own roles in showing deference to environmental decision-makers.102 The Courts’ 
engagements with environmental principles (and their active avoidance) reflect two distinct 
meanings of deference: deference as respect and deference as submission.103 
 
The deference-as-respect model, endorsed but not fully embraced by the Supreme Court of 
Canada,104 requires that reviewing courts “take the tribunal’s decision seriously” and “defer to 
[it] not on the basis of whether they agree with it, but rather, on the basis whether the agency 
 
100 David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” (2016) at 
11 (available online SSRN: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733751>. 
101 Scotford, supra note at ch5. 
102 The peak period for the Courts’ engagement with these principles seems to be from 2010-2016 which coincides 
with a particularly tumultuous period in the state of Canadian administrative law: Stratas, supra note 100.  
103 David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Michael Taggart, ed, The 
Province of Adminsitrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279 [Dyzenhaus]. 
104 See, e.g., Mark Walters, “Respecting Deference as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in 
Canadian Administrative Law” in Hannah Wilberg and Mark Elliott, eds, The Scope and Intensity of Substantive 
Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2015) 395. 
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has justified its determination in terms of its commitment to the value [of equality] that 
provides the rationale for the administrative state.”105 Importantly, the court’s respect must be 
earned.106 As the Supreme Court of Canada has recently affirmed, deference is earned through 
decision-makers providing coherent and reasoned justification for their decisions.107  
 
As we saw in Part II, environmental principles often mediate this respectful relationship 
between the Federal Courts and environmental decision-makers. The Courts intervene when 
decision-makers have failed to offer reasoned justification for their decisions in light of the 
statutory scheme and its environmental context.108 Where the Courts have intervened, it has 
been because no justification is offered, or because the decision-maker fails to account for 
these principles and how they shape the statutory framework within which they must operate. 
The SARA jurisprudence illustrates how environmental principles can help build a coherent legal 
framework that holds public officials accountable to their statutory mandates. These decisions 
adopt a healthy attitude of deference as respect. They recognize that respect must be earned 
and that, in the species-at-risk context, it often is not.  
 
Federal Court decisions which engage with environmental principles take on additional 
significance in light of shifting trends in administrative law and renewed demands of rigorous 
and responsive decisions. The guidance on reasonable decisions provided in Vavilov hews closer 
to the justification requirements of deference-as-respect. Moreover, Vavilov identifies the 
impact of the decision on vulnerable interests and international law as relevant to determining 
whether a decision is justified.109 As noted above, environmental principles have both 
international law pedigree and address the vital, life-sustaining concerns. Thus, borrowing the 
phrasing of the Supreme Court of Canada, environmental principles must be understood as 
essential stars in the “constellation of law and facts that are relevant to a decision” and which 
“operate as constraints on the decision maker in the exercise of its delegated powers.”110 
 
On the other hand, where the Courts resist or avoid applying environmental principles, they 
adopt a stance of deference as submission. They submit to the presumed but undemonstrated 
expertise of environmental decision-makers, when reflexively invoking the bromide that courts 
are not academies of science. Or they submit to a decontextualized understanding of legislative 
 
105 Dyzenhaus, supra note 103 at 303 and 306. See Chen v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 
2019 FCA 170 at paras 51-56 (noting the ambiguities and complexity in the Supreme Court’s guidance). 
106 Murray Hunt, ‘‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of ’Due  
Deference’’’ in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland eds., Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003) 339 at 340. This statement has also been attributed to Canadian administrative law scholar, 
Hudson Janisch in David Mullan, “The True Legacy of Dunsmuir — Disguised Correctness Review?” (15 February 
2018) Double Aspect, online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/02/15/the-true-legacy-of-dunsmuir-%E2%80%95-
disguised- correctness-review/>. 
107 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at especially paras 85, 99, 
101. 
108 Quebec Centre, supra note 38. Greenpeace 2014, supra note 56.  
109 Vavilov, supra note 107 at paras 114, 133-135. 
110 Ibid. at para 105. 
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intent that leaves virtually no role for judicial oversight.111 The shifting backdrop of 
administrative law may again provide some explanation. An underdeveloped concept of 
reasonableness review in the Dunsmuir era failed to clarify the role for environmental principles 
in judicial review.112 What is clear, however, is that principle engagement and principle 
avoidance are part of a larger institutional picture, in which judges grapple with finding a 
consistent approach to deference. 
 
The second institutional feature of the Federal Courts is that they are generalist courts which 
encounter environmental cases relatively rarely. Over their 50-year history, the Federal Court 
and Court of Appeal combined heard environmental cases at an average rate of only six per 
year.113 With few cases overall there is limited opportunity for sustained engagement with 
environmental principles, which inhibits the steady and coherent development of federal 
environmental jurisprudence. This development is further hindered by the fact the Courts deal 
with, in many cases, legislation that is tentative and equivocal in its specific environmental 
protection commitments. Conducting purposive statutory interpretation and applying the 
contextual standard of reasonableness against this backdrop would be challenging even to a 
reviewing court that specialized in environmental law. That said, this chapter has demonstrated 
that there is now a body of decisions that has tackled these challenges by clearly articulating 
legal roles for environmental principles. These decisions serve as important precedents for the 
next 50 years of environmental law at the Federal Courts. 
 
The Future of Environmental Law at the Federal Courts 
 
Environmental issues are back at the forefront of public debate. The climate crisis and the 
contributing role of Canada’s oil and gas sector, collapsing global biodiversity, plastic pollution, 
and relations between Canada and Indigenous nations over lands and resources all mean that 
the Federal Courts will continue to be called on to adjudicate legal issues that engage 
contentious questions about the diverse relationships to the environment in Canada.  
 
Notably on the eve of this 50th anniversary, many of Canada’s key environmental statutes have 
been updated or replaced afresh. They now contain firmer commitments to sustainability, the 
precautionary principle, and access to environmental justice and they explicitly recognize 
Canada’s obligation to mitigate climate change.114 The Federal Courts will play a vital role in 
 
111 Peace Valley, supra note 72. See also Gitxaala Nation, supra note 24 at paras 119-127; reaffirmed in Tsleil-
Waututh Nation, supra note 24 at para 201 and Taseko Mines 2019, supra note 50 at paras 44-46. The harm of this 
approach has been further compounded by a recent decision in which the Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal 
on the basis that its posture of exceptional deference meant the application for review did not meet the minimal 
threshold for granting leave: Raincoast Conservation Foundation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 224, 438 
DLR (4th) 745. 
112 For an illustration of an exceptional posture of deference that influenced this era, see: Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62. 
113 This figure is approximate and includes only decisions on their merits (and not separate interim or costs orders). 
Notably, there is a sharp increase in the number of environmental decisions at the end of the 20th. From this time 
on, the Courts have decided roughly 10 environmental cases annually. 
114 IAA, supra note 61, ss 2, 6(2), (3), 22, 63, 183, 262, 298; Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14, ss 2.5, 6.1. 
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interpreting and enforcing the legal obligations of these new laws. As Part II’s consideration of 
sustainable development shows, the Courts cannot avoid becoming implicated in concerns 
about environmental protection, resource development and Canada’s response to climate 
change. These concerns are built into the legislative purposes and design which the Federal 
Courts are tasked with supervising. The challenge moving forward is how to develop a 




This chapter has examined the Federal Courts’ environmental jurisprudence through the lens of 
environmental principles. Environmental principles have the dual strengths of drawing our 
attention to specific, enduring challenges inherent in environmental decision-making, and 
providing foci for illuminating the Courts’ varied understandings of their role in environmental 
law. We have seen that environmental principles feature in Federal Courts’ environmental 
jurisprudence, sometimes prominently and influentially. At the same time, the majority of 
decisions by the Federal Courts do not engage with these principles. Indeed, we saw that, on 
occasion, the Courts actively avoid this engagement by invoking the platitude that they are not 
academies of science. 
 
Indeed, Federal Court judges are not scientists. They are judicial experts who use the tools of 
statutory interpretation and common law reasoning to resolve disputes about the exercise of 
public power over the environment. This chapter has sought to show that environmental 
principles are an important part of this legal tool box, which can refine, clarify and stabilize the 
legal obligations created across federal environmental law. Moreover, it has argued that courts 
cannot avoid the underlying environmental challenges and concerns highlighted by these 
principles when they exercise their reviewing function. Environmental principles allow for the 
development of a coherent, transparent and incremental approach to performing this essential 
rule-of-law task. 
 
  
